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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 Michael Heinrich pleaded guilty to the production of 
child pornography.  On appeal, he challenges the District 
Court’s pretrial exclusion of his proffered expert evidence. 
I 
After a four-year-old told her parents that Heinrich, a 
family friend, had pulled her pants down and taken pictures of 
her, Pennsylvania state police conducted a consensual search 
of Heinrich’s electronic devices looking for child pornography.  
Police found over a dozen sexually explicit images and/or 
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videos of two children.   
Heinrich was charged with fifteen counts of using or 
inducing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the 
purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), as well as one count of 
possessing material depicting the sexual exploitation of a 
minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  Heinrich 
admitted both to taking the pictures and videos and that they 
depicted sexually explicit conduct.  He nonetheless planned to 
defend himself against the production charges by claiming he 
lacked the specific intent required under § 2251(a).  To this 
end, Heinrich proffered an expert witness: psychologist Robert 
Schwartz.1  The government moved to exclude the proffered 
 
1 Dr. Schwartz planned to testify on a range of topics, including 
(1) a physical and behavioral description of Heinrich; (2) 
Heinrich’s tragic childhood and family background; (3) 
Heinrich’s self-reported sexual history; (4) his impressions and 
the significance of the Abel and Look Assessments, which 
suggest that Heinrich is not sexually interested in minors; (5) 
his impressions and the significance of other psychological 
tests performed on Heinrich indicating a sexual interest in adult 
women, lack of interest in sexual deviance, and a depressed 
outlook on life; (6) his impressions of Heinrich’s hoarding 
behavior, of which he believes photography is a manifestation; 
(7) his impressions of statements made by Heinrich during the 
course of his evaluation; and (8) his impressions of statements 
made by Heinrich’s sister and son during the course of his 
evaluation.  Ultimately, Dr. Schwartz sought “to testify that it 
is his impression, given his background and expertise, that Mr. 
Heinrich intended to merely capture the minors’ beauty and 
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evidence, arguing that it was inadmissible (1) to negate the 
requisite mens rea because the charged offenses were general 
intent crimes, and (2) under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 
403, 702, or 704(b).2   
After a pretrial hearing on the applicability of Rule 
704(b),3 the District Judge’s law clerk conducted a telephonic 
status conference, “advis[ing counsel] that the court was 
intending to grant the government’s motions to exclude 
defendant’s expert testimony.”  Heinrich Br. 16 (quoting App. 
2).  The law clerk explained that the basis for the exclusion was 
Rules 403 and 704(b) and that a written opinion would be 
forthcoming.  No opinion or order was ever docketed.  Notably, 
the District Judge did not participate in the telephone status 
conference.  The call went unrecorded and has not been 
transcribed.   
Based on what appeared to be an evidentiary “ruling,” 
Heinrich entered a conditional guilty plea to three counts of 
violating § 2251(a).  He reserved the right to appeal the 
exclusion of the proposed expert evidence.  Heinrich now 
argues, among other things, that we should remand this case to 
the District Court because the evidentiary exclusion under 
 
innocence in his photographs. . . . [H]e did not intend to create 
child pornography when he photographed the minors in this 
case.”  App. 73–74. 
2 The District Court ruled that the production of child 
pornography under § 2251(a) is a specific intent crime.  We 
need not decide whether that ruling was correct.  
3 At that hearing, the District Court focused exclusively on 
Rules 401 and 704. 
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Rules 403 and 704(b) was erroneous. 
II4 
As this appeal centers on a decision to exclude the 
proffered expert evidence, we review for an abuse of 
discretion.  See United States v. Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138, 151 
(3d Cir. 2019).  A court “necessarily abuse[s] its discretion if 
it base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.”  Cooter 
& Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).  It also 
abuses its discretion if its decision “rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact . . . or an improper application of law 
to fact.”  Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 131 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
III5 
Under Rule 403, a district court has broad discretion to 
“exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.”  Although “a 
detailed balancing statement in each and every case is 
unrealistic,” United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 572 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 766 
 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
5 Heinrich initially claims that exclusion of the proposed 
evidence deprived him of the right to present a defense under 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Sixth 
Amendment.  We do not address that argument here. 
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(3d Cir. 1978)), we have a strong preference that a district court 
explicitly engage in some 403 balancing on the record.  See, 
e.g., Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 277 (3d Cir. 
2017) (“[W]e strongly prefer that the District Court explain 
how it balanced the Rule 403 considerations.”); Long, 574 F.2d 
at 766 (“Where an objection does invoke Rule 403, the trial 
judge should record his balancing analysis to the extent that his 
exercise of discretion may be fairly reviewed on appeal.”).  
When a trial court engages in such a balancing process and 
articulates on the record the rationale for its conclusion, its 
determination is rarely disturbed.  See United States v. 
Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 1992); Gov’t of the Virgin 
Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 918 (3d Cir. 1992).   
If the record fails to include an explicit Rule 403 
analysis, “we either ‘decide the trial court implicitly performed 
the required balance; or, if we decide the trial court did not, we 
undertake to perform the balance ourself.’  We have declined 
to balance those factors de novo only where a district court said 
nothing about particular evidence’s probative value or 
prejudicial effect.”  Greenspan, 923 F.3d at 151 (quoting 
Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 572).  Stated differently, we may decline 
to perform our own balancing exercise “[w]here [the trial 
court’s] rationale is not apparent from the record, [meaning] 
there is no way to review its discretion.”  Sampson, 980 F.2d 
at 889; see also United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 284 
(3d Cir. 2014) (“The reasoning underlying the Court’s Rule 
403 balancing was not apparent from the record. This omission 
provides an independent ground for reversal.”) (citations 
omitted); Pinney, 967 F.2d at 917–18 (where the trial court’s 
reasoning is not apparent from the record, “[w]e are . . . unable 
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to defer to the . . . trial court”).  Grounds for reversal therefore 
exist where a record lacks both an explicit Rule 403 balancing 
and any discussion of the district court’s rationale.6 
While we could conduct our own Rule 403 balancing 
here, or hold that the District Court implicitly balanced, we will 
refrain from doing so for three reasons. 
First, our ability to review for an abuse of discretion is 
severely hampered if we are unable to derive from the record a 
district court’s rationale for excluding the expert’s proffered 
evidence.  Here, the record before us lacks any meaningful 
discussion by the District Court of Rule 403.  Not only did the 
District Judge fail to explicitly apply the balancing test, he 
neglected to even mention probative value or the potential for 
prejudice. 
Second, a district judge is always better positioned than 
we are to engage in a thorough Rule 403 analysis in the first 
instance.  “The trial judge, not the appellate judge, is in the best 
position to assess the extent of the prejudice caused a party by 
a piece of evidence. The appellate judge works with a cold 
record, whereas the trial judge is there in the courtroom.”  
Long, 574 F.2d at 767; see also United States v. Vosburgh, 602 
F.3d 512, 537 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[l]ike any balancing test, 
 
6 This Court has also refused to engage in a de novo Rule 403 
balancing where a district court’s analysis was a mere token 
effort.  See Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 284 (remanding the case 
where the entirety of the district court’s analysis consisted of 
re-iterating several passages found in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence). 
 8 
 
the Rule 403 standard is inexact, requiring sensitivity on the 
part of the trial court to the subtleties of the particular situation, 
and considerable deference on the part of the reviewing court 
to the hands-on judgment of the trial judge”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted); Construction Ltd. v. 
Brooks-Skinner Building Co., 488 F.2d 427, 431 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(“The task of assessing potential prejudice is one for which the 
trial judge, considering his familiarity with the full array of 
evidence in a case, is particularly suited.”).  Normally, a record 
is sufficiently detailed to enable meaningful appellate review, 
but we are not dealing with the typical case.  Rather, both 
parties ask us to undertake a de novo assessment of expert 
evidence where we have little to review.  Such an analysis is 
best left to the District Court in this instance. 
Third, and most importantly, there simply could not 
have been an exercise of discretion here because the District 
Judge failed to issue any ruling excluding either the proposed 
expert report or any testimony.  District judges have broad 
powers, some of which they may properly delegate to a law 
clerk, who serves as a “judicial adjunct.”  Connolly v. Nat’l 
Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1999).  But a 
law clerk’s “duties and responsibilities are to assist [a] judge in 
his work, not to be the judge.”  Id.  Problems arise when a law 
clerk engages—whether through his own initiative or at the 
behest of his or her judge—in judicial tasks that are non-
delegable.  Compare Sanders v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 193 F.3d 
1080 (9th Cir. 1999) (judge erred by directing law clerk to 
preside over final pretrial conference), and Connolly, 177 F.3d 
593 (counsel had no obligation to allow law clerk to mediate 
dispute, despite judge ordering the parties to participate), and 
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Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1995) (law clerk 
erroneously convened court, in absence of the judge, to read 
back testimony for jury), with United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 
1095 (9th Cir. 2002) (no error where law clerk read the jury’s 
question into the record and discussed alternative Allen charges 
with counsel while waiting for the judge to arrive). 
In this case, the District Judge’s law clerk conducted a 
one-hour-and-fifteen-minute unrecorded and untranscribed 
telephone conference where he advised counsel that the Judge 
intended to exclude the proposed expert report under Rules 403 
and 704(b).  The law clerk also stated that an “opinion to 
support this ruling” would be forthcoming.  Heinrich Br. 16.  
Since this conference call did not involve the District Judge, 
and because no formal ruling, order, or opinion was ever 
docketed, we are left in the unenviable position—indeed, 
impossible position—of attempting to review an adjunct-
presented non-ruling that caused the Defendant to plead guilty 
rather than proceed to trial. 
We again renew our admonition that district courts 
articulate their Rule 403 reasoning on the record.  See Egan, 
851 F.3d at 277.  A basic part of the balancing process requires 
making a record.7  It is simple to do and essential to effective 
 
7 We emphasize that it is also the responsibility of counsel to 
ensure that the record is accurate and complete.  Here, the 
parties should have insisted that the Court issue a ruling 
excluding the proffered expert evidence, if that was the District 
Judge’s intent.  See, e.g., Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 284 
(government requested explicit Rule 403 balancing for the 
record). 
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appellate review. 
We also expect a district judge to assure that no 
inappropriate assumptions of judicial authority or appearances 
thereof occur either in chambers or through communications 
with parties, counsel, or the public.  Regrettably, the District 
Judge’s unusual and inappropriate delegation of this telephone 
conference to his law clerk (if, in fact, that is what transpired 
here), created serious appearance problems. 
For these reasons, we will not as a panel undertake a 
de novo Rule 403 analysis. 
IV 
 We are also disinclined to perform a de novo Rule 
704(b) analysis as to the proffered expert evidence.  Although 
the District Court devoted a full hearing to address the 
applicability of 704(b), it failed to issue any associated ruling.  
Moreover, it is unclear from the record what elements of the 
report the District Court allegedly intended to exclude under 
Rule 704(b) as opposed to Rule 403.  As these and other 
previously mentioned issues have obstructed our ability to 
review for an abuse of discretion, the District Court should bear 
the burden of rectifying the situation. 
V 
 Considering the circumstances, we will vacate the 
judgment and remand the case to the District Court for an 
explicit ruling on the government’s motion to exclude, to be 
accompanied by a detailed memorandum opinion on the 
 11 
 
proffered expert evidence setting forth the Court’s findings and 
conclusions. 
